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upon arrival and linkup, three of which were non-missioncapable. The SFAAT does not have organic maintenance support and lacks a funding source to purchase vehicle parts or contracted services. A major issue at NTC was the availability, ſelding, and logistical support of force tracking and communications equipment for SFAAT teams. Given the sustainment challenges to support multiple SFAATs, any BCT deploying to support a security force assistance brigade mission should strongly consider not reorganizing its organic brigade support battalion into SFAATs; the brigade support battalion is vitally important to the overall sustainment of all SFAATs from the BCT. The advanced logistical support provided by the brigade support battalion is the key to sustaining the SFAATs within the brigade. Recommendations C onduct a mission readiness exercise. Ensure that every person on the SFAAT completes required theater training requirements and that the team conducts a credible mission readiness exercise, preferably as an established team. The JRTC Advisor Academy provides premier training that consists of language and cultural training, key leader engagements with retired Afghan soldiers, and lessons on the advisor role in a deployed theater according to Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance.9 One SFAAT leader, in a previous rotation, remarked that his team learned ". . . security force assistance is the uniſed action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." Build and sustain team integrity. This allows personnel on the team to know that their teammates are prepared and ready to assume their roles. It also allows members to learn each other's strengths and areas that require additional focus before linking up with ANSF counterparts. It is important to build team integrity during any training rotation, but it is equally important to sustain it into the deployment. Valuable lessons, which will eventually prove successful in-theater, are gained in the overall training framework. Establish peer-to-peer advisory relationships. All SFAATs should be able to properly advise their ANA/ANSF counterparts at the command and staff levels and ensure that the process occurs parallelly, vertically, and horizontally. This includes sourcing SFAAT positions with personnel of the proper rank and experience level and engaging and advising counterparts at all levels. Personnel selected for advisory duties must be adept at the tasks and functions that they will teach to others and must possess the proper attributes to be effective advisors. Furthermore, it is important to provide advisor-speciſc training to SFAAT members before having them mentor ANA forces.10 With a proper SFAAT structure in place, coupled with trained and vetted personnel, a more effective, accurate, and credible assessment of established counterinsurgency metrics can be attained, which reduces ambiguity for any ANSF readiness assessments. 60 Engineer Deploy cohort SFAATs that are organic or assigned to a brigade before deployment. This would provide the teams with an established command and support relationship and a dedicated brigade level staff to address any requirements. Moreover, it would address any mission and sustainment gaps, as the brigade would have a dedicated SFAAT mission and the resources required to meet mission success. Additionally, allow the SFAAT team leaders time to inƀuence professional development training at training centers; develop tactics, techniques, and procedures; and prepare standing operating procedures.11 It would be presumptuous to imply that the recommended solutions will address all SFAAT development and training issues. However, the recommendations can be applied to any future SFAATs and their speciſc training requirements with reasonable validity. By properly applying the training framework and principles, it can be reasonably expected that any SFAAT would have the baseline knowledge and skills to perform its mission. Endnotes: 1 Mark Axelberg, "Enhancing Security Force Assistance: Advisor Selection, Training, and Employment," U.S. Army War College strategy research project, 22 March 2011, p. 27. 2 Morgan Smiley, "Combat Advisor Unit for Afghanistan Transition," Small Wars Journal, 15 December 2011. 3 Field Manual 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 2009, p. 7-4. 4 Headquarters, International Security Force Joint Command, SFAAT predeployment training survey, October 2012. 5 W.D. Eyre, "14 Tenets for Mentoring the Afghan National Army," The Bulletin, Volume 14, Number 1, March 2008, pp. 1-9. 6 Brennan Cook, "Improving Security Force Assistance Capability in the Army's Advise and Assist Brigade," School of Advanced Military Studies, 10 May 2010. 7 Joshua J. Potter, "American Advisors: Security Force Assistance Model in the Long War," Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2011. 8 Axelberg, 2011, p. 23. 9 Field Manual 3.07.1, Security Force Assistance, 1 May 2009. 10 Sean R. Pirone, "Security Force Assistance, Strategic, Advisory, and Partner Nation Considerations," thesis, Naval Post Graduate School, December 2010, p. 47. 11 Headquarters, International Security Force Joint Command SFAAT, predeployment training survey, October 2012. Lieutenant Colonel Ware is the commander of the 30th Engineer Battalion, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. January–April 2013