Engineer

MAY-AUG 2013

Engineer presents professional information designed to keep U.S. military and civilian engineers informed of current and emerging developments within their areas of expertise for the purpose of enhancing their professional development.

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publishing about invading Europe since 1940. A U.S. Army engineer, Colonel Thompson had begun planning the invasion even before the declaration of war. He commanded the 1st Engineer Special Brigade on D-Day.1 Wherever the eventual beachhead, the Germans continued to fortify and deny space all along the French shore. Once the planning of Operation Overlord began, it was apparent that fve beaches— code-named Juno, Sword, Gold, Utah, and Omaha—would be required to land many troops. U.S. forces would focus on Utah Beach (assigned to the 4th Infantry Division) and Omaha Beach (assigned to the 1st Infantry Division—the Big Red One). To land the equipment needed for the invasion to succeed, General Eisenhower would require weeks of secure and sustained entry at Normandy. D-Day served only to begin the initial assault to defeat the German overwatch. This included fve battalions of combat engineers. In the days that followed, 10 more battalions of Army engineers and six naval engineer units would land on Omaha Beach to build up the foothold seized. An operation known as Mulberry Harbor established a portable harbor from 8 to 25 June 1944. Although short-lived, it created the necessary harbor infrastructure and initial lodgment required for follow-on forces. The Big Red One faced only three obstacles at Omaha Beach: the beach itself, the 100-foot cliffs beyond it, and the obstacles emplaced by the Germans. All of them were covered by machine gun fre. As natural obstacles, the cliffs jut out from pebbly sand, which made foot maneuver diffcult and provided excellent vantage points and felds of fre for the Germans. This stretch of beach had 8,000 yards of frontage; the villages to the rear were Colleville, St. Laurent, and Vierville. The beachfront was divided into seven lanes: Dog Green, Dog White, Dog Red, Easy Green, Easy Red, Fox Green, and Fox Red.2 These entry lanes corresponded roughly to fve natural draws that led inland to the villages. These draws became known as exit roads.3 Once prepared, the exit roads became transit routes for vehicles, tanks, and artillery pieces intended to support the ground forces that were seizing forward areas. May–August 2013 The Germans emplaced extensive obstacle belts to deny the space to Allied forces. The German obstacle belt was emplaced under the management of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel. He reported to Field Marshall Gerd von Rundstedt, which caused some animosities, since responsibilities were assigned by Adolf Hitler.4 A number of constraints hampered Field Marshal Rommel's creativity in designing his engagement area. There were 50 German divisions in France, with nine designated for coastal defense, but the principal fghting of the war was not in France. Therefore, these divisions were at less than full strength (in some cases, at only 50 percent strength) and were led by inexperienced cadre. Often, these units were used to backfll divisions on the Eastern Front.5 Field Marshal Rommel began his defense with a tidal zone obstacle design in the littorals of the coast, using underwater mines and Teller mines atop long, wooden poles to accommodate the tide. These mines were connected to each other with antihandling devices and wire. In total, 31,000 mines and 517,000 nonexplosive obstacles were strung along the Atlantic Wall to deny the space.6 Most of these were emplaced inland from the littoral region to hamper paratroopers rather than landing craft. The obstacles at Omaha were manned by the German 352d Infantry Division, a "Type 44" division. This type of division included just over 12,000 soldiers, of whom 6,800 were combat troops. This was more than 5,000 fewer soldiers than the older model German division.7 Arguably, this reduction to their force contributed to the success of the Allied invasion. Engineer 13

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